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In examining the planning experiences of most
countries, the overwhelming impression is one of
frustration and ineffectiveness. Planning and
planners have simply not lived up to expectations,
and both critiques and recommendations for
improvements abound (e.g. Waterston 1965;
Griffin and Enos 1970; Faber and Seers 1972;
Caiden and Wildavsky 1974). Behind the facade
of technical precision, the development planner
seems to lack effective understanding of his own
society, the ability to predict future trends, and
the means to ensure that plan implementation
takes place. It seems as if every sentence we hear
or read beginning with the words "The plan-
ners . . ." ends with either criticism or ridicule.
The 1950s and 1960s were unusual decades, in
that most countries and international organisations
gave high priority and considerable resources to
econocratic development planning, believing that
through sophisticated planning they would resolve
their problems and create a better world. Now,
optimism has largely been replaced by cynicism,
and planners have come under attack from all
sides, becoming the 'whipping boys' of politicians,
consultants, academics, and large sectors of the
general public.
This article is written in the belief that contem-
porary planning in most countries and situations
is inadequate and sometimes even harmful, but
that suggestions to 'abolish planning' are funda-
mentally wrong. My objective is to present a viable
conception of and role for planning, and to
suggest a model which can serve as a basis for
development planning in the future. Very little
of what I will say is new. My only claim to
originality is that I give different emphasis to
each issue and activity than other authors, pro-
ducing a recipe which contains virtually all the
same ingredients, but mixed in different propor-
tions and in a different order.
What is planning?
In broad terms, planning is concerned with de-
fining and achieving objectives for the future, so
that the changes occurring in particular societies
and nations are not determined simply by for-
tuitous or external circumstances, but through the
purposive decisions and actions of some or all
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of their inhabitants. It must be recognised, how-
ever, that perfect, comprehensive planning
assumes the divine powers of omniscience,
omnipresence and omnipotence, and that such
a situation is clearly impossible. lt is obvious,
therefore, that planning can only be conducted
for a limited range of activities and for
a limited time period, and that it may be
little more than "an ideal of rational reorgan-
isation, where less is wasted through neglect
and confusion, or the pursuit of incompatible
ideals" (Leys and Marris 1971: 270). No society
can assume perfect knowledge of the present,
total autonomy and control over its own affairs,
the ability to predict future trends and events, or
a universal consensus on desired changes for the
future (see Bauman 1967). Wc live in an uncertain,
interdependent, and frequently conflictive world,
and it is absurd to believe that a society can pre-
cisely design and create its future. At best, at the
societal level, planning is an attempt to define,
and to move in, a desired direction. It must face
internal dissent and apathy, and external opposi-
tion. Development planning is a task much more
difficult than that normally faced by the architect-
builder of a house, or the designer-manager of an
industrial production line, so that a simplistic
design-execute or plan-implement model is bound
to fail.
Development planning is a venture into the un-
known, creating situations and problems which
have never previously existed in a given context.
Such a process necessitates a capacity for con-
tinuous action, monitoring, response and innova-
tion, rather than simply the preparation and
execution of a master plan. These requirements
have been recognised by many city-planners
dissatisfied with the traditional master plan
approach, and a broad concept of 'action plan-
ning' (see Koenigsberger 1964, 1968; Wakely,
Schnietzer and Mumtaz 1976) has resulted. The
action planning approach is a great advance over
rigid master planning, but action planning roles
and activities have been inadequately specified.
There is a grave danger that action planning
will degenerate into 'disjointed incrementalisni'
(Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963: 81-143), a
model possessing admirable flexibility, but little
capacity to deal with a serious depression or
sudden crisis. The rapidity of change and the
necessity to consider planning as a 'trial and error
learning process' rather than 'the design and crea-
tion of Utopia', have also been recognised by a
group of North American authors. This 'planning
as societal learning school', headed by such figures
as Michael (1968, 1973), Dunn (1971), Friedmann
(1973) and Bell (1974), has produced works of
considerable merit in the analysis and prognosis
of technological and social change, but has not
provided an adequate model for the planning
process.
What is new about planning?
in terms of definition, contemporary planning is
no different from the planning conducted by our
forefathers. Planning has always been concerned
with defining and achieving objectives for the
future, and the significant differences between
past and present planning lie in professionalism
and division of labour, rather than in the basic
task. In recent years, planning has been pro-
fessionalised, and planners are expected to under-
take specialised training, to acquire qualifications,
and to possess skills which are not known to the
common man, or even to many public adminis-
trators and politicians. Naturally, professional-
isation is a mixed blessing. On the one hand,
technical expertise is increasingly necessary in a
sophisticated world, but on the other hand, as
Illich (1971, 1975) describes for teachers and
doctors, professionalism can foster pretentious
attitudes, the creation of techno-bureaucratic
vested interest groups, and the increasing isolation
of professionals from those they are intended to
serve. In terms of division of labour, most coun-
tries have imposed a sharp dividing line between
those who write plan documents (construct plans),
and those who implement them, and this division
is often enshrined in separation of responsibility,
not only between professionals, but also between
government departments. Separation can easily
result in isolation, and many writers have pointed
to inadequate plan implementation as the funda-
mental impediment to effective planning (e.g.
Waterston 1965: 293-370; Gross 1967; Cacho
1975).
The professionalisation of planning and the
division of labour between those who write
plans and those who implement them have
institutionalised a 'narrow view' of planning.
Narrow-planning is simply the preparation of
plans; the writing of plan documents and
the drawing of maps and diagrams for plan-
ning purposes. lt is usually the task of professional
planners, and takes place in specialised planning
offices, or even in 'Ministries of Planning'.
Narrow-planning tends to be technocratic, rarely
has any effective form of public participation,
and often only marginally involves the participa-
tion of society's leaders. lt is usually a discontin-
uous process focused on documents rather than
real-world changes, and hence it is often dubbed
paper planning'. It easily degenerates into
"pseudo-planning" (Seers 1972), or "a symbolic
charade" (Bromley 1977). At worst, narrow-
planning is simply a waste of time, money and
personnel, tending to postpone or even prevent
change, rather than to bring it about.
An alternative lo narrow-planning
If we are to escape from the evils of narrow-
planning, we must return to our original ideal of
planning as 'defining and achieving objectives for
the future', establishing a concept of 'broad-
planning' which facilitates this process. Broad-
planning can be considered as the integral process
of deliberate societal change. lt is achieved
through the analysis of relevant information in-
cluding consultations with all relevant interest
groups, the preparation of forecasts, the selection
of objectives, the construction and authorisation
of plans of action, the implementation of these
plans, and the monitoring, evaluation, and pro-
gressive modification of the plans, implementation
strategies, and results achieved. Broad-planning
is necessarily a continuous, integrated process,
affecting and involving a substantial part of
society, and particularly involving those who hold
political and economic power. Because most of
those involved do not have a professional train-
ing in 'narrow-planning', broad-planning can
avoid excesses of technocracy and utopianism,
and can facilitate mobility of personnel between
institutions concerned with different parts or
levels of the planning process.
The broad-planning model shown in Figure 1
is intended to avoid the drawbacks of most con-
temporary development planning, and to present a
process which is more intelligible than the avail-
able literature on 'action planning' or 'planning
as societal learning'. The model presents a
sequence of activities which, once begun in box
I, develops into a continuous process, with an
ongoing flow of information, and sometimes also
of instructions, from box I to box 10, and with
feedbacks of information and instructions con-
verting the essentially linear sequence from 1 to
10 into a series of interrelated loops. Individuals
and departments can specialise in particular sec-
tions of the process, and yet all parts of the
process should be considered as part of a single,
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closely integrated whole. The model is deliberately
simple as it must be comprehensible to all politi-
cians and government officials, and to a substan-
tial proportion of the population, if it is to be
successful.
The model as presented facilitates the close inte-
gration of annual budgeting cycles into the plan-
ning process, and permits the presentation of
quarterly and annual reviews of progress, and lists
of projects and estimated completion dates. There
is no absolute requirement for a single major
plan document, but the process does not preclude
the preparation of annual or medium-term (three
to 10 year) plans. For most countries, medium-
term plans should be only for three or four year
periods, and should either be coordinated with
annual budgets and plans to produce a rolling
plan system, or with the electoral cycle if govern-
ment changes are usually regular, as in Colombia
and the United States. Even in relatively unstable
contexts, however, short- and medium-term plans
should be based upon long-term 'generalised
objectives' so as to avoid a concentration upon
capital intensive projects yielding quick returns
at the cost of neglecting more fundamental long-
term transformations and distributional issues.
The model does not impose any particular insti-
tutional structure for planning, but the necessity
of closely interlinking plan construction with
plan implementation suggests that both operations
should normally be conducted within the same
institutions, working on particular sectors (e.g. in
executive Ministries), and at the national, regional,
and local levels. Inter-sectoral and inter-regional
allocation issues should normally be resolved
mainly at the highest level of national government,
the Presidency or Prime Minister's Office, and the
Cabinet or Ruling Council. supported by a small
advisory Planning Secretariat.
A major feature of this model is the emphasis
given to data collection and evaluation, including
the consultation of relevant interest groups, the
ident I leal ion of trends, forecasting, and the
monitoring of ongoing projects and programmes.
The weakness of these activities in many contem-
porary planning systems is as grave a deficiency
as the virtually total separation of plan construc-
tion and plan implementation. The title of
Stolper's (1966) work Planning wit/unit Facts, is
a rellection of the realities of development plan-
ning in most parts of the world. Information is
either non-existent or virtually useless, uselessness
being a function of the collection of irrelevant
data, long delays in data processing and publica-
tion, or simple inaccuracy of information. Project
evaluation is usually impeded by the absence of
baseline or control group data, and major data
sources such as censuses, national accounts
statistics, and topographic maps often seem to be
designed more for international comparisons and
foreign researchers than for planning purposes.
There is a special need for a reorganisation of
data collection and processing in most countries,
so that the information collected can be more
accurately attuned to the needs of efficient devel-
opment planning, and so that data can he pre-
sented more quickly and disaggregated more easily
to give information about distribution by local
areas and specific social groups.
Limitations of the model
Though the proposed model can help to improve
the quality of decision making and plan imple-
mentation, and can ensure interaction between
different interest groups, its adoption cannot
resolve the fundamental issues of political power
and participation. Most of the issues left unre-
solved by the model are those which condition
the objectives of planning itself. No planning
systeni can resolve the problems of a country
run by a mentally unbalanced dictator, or a
country in the throes of civil war. An effective
planning system helps those in power to achieve
their objectives, but it does not decide who
holds power or what their political ideologies
and objectives should be. The model does not
guarantee large scale 'popular participation in
planning', and such participation is probably
impossible unless there is a high degree of admin-
istrative and fiscal decentralisation, and a pre-
dominance of 'social property' rather than private
enterprise or state ownership. Similarly, the model
does not resolve the issue of whether planners
should adopt politicised advocacy roles (see
Kasperson and Breitbart 1974), or should attempt
to wear a cloak of political neutrality, simply
servicing the objectives of politicians. Advocacy
planning implies great enthusiasm and commit-
ment on the part of planners, but it also
implies great instability in the civil service
whenever there isa change of government.
The model also fails to tell us what balance to
give to indicative and niandatory measures, or to
material and moral incentives, and it does not
help us to resolve problems of corruption in
government. In a sense, therefore, this brief
article dodges the major issues of development
policy and merely presents a highly generalised
model, integrating information collection and
transfer, plan construction, and plan implemen-
tation. The model is applicable to all major types
of development planning (economic, social,
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spatial and physical), and to planning at the
national, regional and local levels. It can be used
both for comprehensive planning of countries or
smaller areas, and for the planning of selected
programmes and projects without an all-embracing
comprehensive plan. In most countries, compre-
hensive plans are both technically and politically
naive (see Leys 1972: 74; Killick 1976). Issues of
inter-sectoral and inter-regional allocation, and
long term societal objectives, must be determined
through an esentially political process with techni-
cal advice, rather than through an essentially
technical process subsequently presented for poli-
cal approval. There is no single optimum devel-
opment strategy for a given country. There are
nany possible optima, each favouring a particular
balance of interests and representing a different
set of priorities. Planning is essentially a process
of policy definition and implementation, and
policy is both politically determined and has ex-
plicit or implicit political objectives.
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